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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals to 
hear this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann., § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1991). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court err in granting defendant's Motion for PIP 
Setoff and ordering that $3,000.00 be deducted from plaintiff's 
judgment totalling $9,000.00 in special and general damages when 
the parties' stipulation was limited to the fact that the $7,815.00 
in medical charges represented reasonable charges for the medical 
services incurred by plaintiff as a result of the subject collision 
and did not further provide that the medical treatments were 
necessary or that the $7,815.00 amount would reasonably compensate 
Plaintiff for his medical expenses? 
This case presents a question of statutory interpretation 
involving the application of Utah Code Ann.. § 31A-22-309(6) (Supp. 
1992). The appellate court accords the trial court's statutory 
interpretations no particular deference but assesses them for 
correctness. State v. Rio Vista Oilr Ltd.. 786 P. 2d 1343, 1347 
(Utah 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Utah Code Ann.. § 31A-22-309(6) (Supp. 1992), set forth below, 
is determinative of the question at issue in this appeal: 
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection 
coverage is subject to the following: 
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(a) that where the insured under the policy is or 
would be held legally liable for the personal 
injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits 
required under personal injury protection have been 
paid by another insurer, including the Workmans' 
Compensation Fund of Utah, the insurer of the 
person who would be legally liable shall reimburse 
the other insurer for the payment, but not in 
excess of the amount of damages recoverable; and 
(b) that the issue of liability for that 
reimbursement and its amount shall be decided by 
mandatory, binding arbitration between the 
insurers. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant/appellee, Steve Quimby, agrees with the statement of 
the case made by plaintiff/appellant, Winton Aposhian, to the 
extent that it is supported by the record and, in addition, 
pursuant to Rule 24(b), Utah R. App. P. (1992), makes the following 
statement of facts relevant to the issues presented for review: 
1. Plaintiff's no-fault insurer, State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Companies, paid Plaintiff $3,000.00 for PIP 
insurance benefits prior to the trial of this action [T. 219]. 
2. Windsor Insurance Group was Defendant's insurance 
carrier. [T. 215-219]. 
3. Windsor Insurance Group received a PIP subrogation claim 
notice from State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Companies, 
claiming reimbursement for the $3,000.00 it paid to plaintiff. [T. 
4. The trial court ordered that the jury verdict of 
$4,000.00 for medical expense damages be reduced by $3,000.00, 
representing the amount of the PIP subrogation claim of State Farm 
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Mutual Automobile Insurance Companies against Windsor Insurance 
Group. [T. 268-269]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann., § 31A-22-309(b) (Supp. 1992), and relevant 
case law clearly provide that the trial court's reduction of the 
$4,000.00 jury verdict for medical expense damages by $3,000.00, 
the amount of medical expense damages for which plaintiff had been 
previously compensated by PIP benefits by his own no-fault insurer, 
was the proper process to follow in order to prevent a double 
recovery by plaintiff. Plaintiff thereby received exactly what the 
jury determined he should to compensate him for the medical 
expenses he incurred. Plaintiff's arguments on appeal are faulty 
because their only support lies in the erroneous assertion that the 
parties stipulated to the amount of medical expense damages he 
should receive, when in fact the stipulation established only that 
the medical charges incurred by plaintiff "represent[ed] reasonable 
charges for medical services... incurred as a result of the subject 
collision, and ...may be entered into evidence without the need of 
further foundation." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER REDUCING THE 
JURY VERDICT BY $3,000.00, REPRESENTING THE 
PIP SUBROGATION CLAIM, WAS PROPER AND SHOULD 
BE AFFIRMED. 
Plaintiff/appellant, Winton Aposhian ("Plaintiff"), describes 
the issue he advances on appeal as being one of statutory 
3 
interpretation involving Utah Code Ann,. § 31A-22-309(6) 
(Supp.1992), which provides: 
Every policy providing personal injury 
protection coverage is subject to the 
following: 
(a) that where the insured under the 
policy is or would be held legally liable 
for the personal injury sustained by any 
person to whom benefits required under 
personal injury protection have been paid 
by another insurer, including the 
Workers7 Compensation Fund of Utah, the 
insurer of the person who would be held 
legally liable shall reimburse the other 
insurer for the payment, but not in 
excess of the amount of damages 
recoverable; and 
(b) that the issue of liability for that 
reimbursement and its amount shall be 
decided by mandatory, binding arbitration 
between the insurers. 
Defendant/appellee, Steve Quimby ("Defendant"), submits that 
§ 31A-22-309(6) provides authority for the $3,000.00 reduction in 
the ultimate award ordered by the trial court judge in this case. 
Plaintiff contends that in cases such as this where the injured 
party has received less than the amount of damages he prayed for 
and anticipated, § 31A-22-309(6) should be construed to produce a 
result contrary to the rule that "a tortfeasor is not personally 
liable to the injured insured for special damages previously 
compensated by PIP benefits from the no-fault insurer." Laub v. 
South Central Utah Telephone Ass'n. 657 P.2d 1304, 1307 (Utah 
1982) . 
The linchpin upon which Plaintiff's argument turns is his 
mischaracterization of the scope and meaning of the Stipulation to 
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Summary of Medical Charges and jury instruction number 11. 
Defendant did not stipulate that $7,815.00 was the correct amount 
of damages to be awarded Plaintiff for medical expenses. The 
Stipulation to Summary of Medical Charges stated: 
The above-named parties, through their 
respective counsel, hereby stipulate that the 
summary of plaintiff's medical charges (a copy 
of which is attached as Exhibit "A") represent 
reasonable charges for medical services 
plaintiff Winton Aposhian incurred as a result 
of the subject collision, and that these 
amounts may be entered into evidence without 
the need of further foundation. 
[T. 114 (Addendum at "A")]. The agreement that the charges for 
medical services incurred were reasonable and that no foundation 
was necessary is not the functional equivalent of an agreement that 
those charges were reasonably and necessarily incurred. The jury 
that heard this case ascertained the amount of medical expense 
damages to which plaintiff was entitled. [T. 206 (Addendum at 
"C")]. The jury was instructed: "$7,815.00 incurred in accident 
related medical expenses. Since the parties have so agreed, you 
are to take these facts as true for purposes of this case." [T. 
174 (Addendum at "B")]. They awarded Plaintiff $4,000.00. It is 
that "judicial ascertainment of damages" that is the benchmark from 
which the analysis of the issue before this court must proceed. 
Utah law clearly provides that the trial court's reduction of 
the ultimate judgment by the amount of the PIP benefits paid by 
plaintiff's insurer was proper. "[T]he tort-feasor's liability 
insurer, in fulfilling its duty to respond to the claims of the 
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insured party to the limits of its policy, stands in the shoes of 
its insured and pays on the basis of its insured 's personal 
liability to the tort victim; this personal liability does not 
include PIP payments.11 Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 
1197, 1203 (Utah 1980). 
[P]revention of double recovery is one of the 
purposes of the Utah Automobile No-Fault 
Insurance Act. And in keeping with that 
purpose, we recently upheld a trial court's 
reducing the special damages of a judgment by 
the amount of damages previously compensated 
by PIP benefits. Dupuis v. Nielsenf Utah, 624 
P.2d 685 (1981). Dupuis followed naturally 
from our holding in Allstate Insurance Co. v. 
Ivie, Utah, 606 P. 2d 1197 (1980), that a tort-
feasor is not personally liable to the injured 
insured for special damages previously 
compensated by PIP benefits from the no-fault 
insurer, and that the injured party should 
therefore not be allowed even to plead for 
those damages. However, if a plaintiff does 
improperly plead for previously compensated 
damages and they are allowed to be included in 
the judgmentf they court should, at the 
conclusion of trial, either on its own 
initiative or on motion of a party, reduce the 
judgment by the amount of those previously 
compensated damages. and thereby prevent 
double recovery. (emphasis added). 
Laub, 652 P.2d at 1307. The procedure followed by the trial court 
in this case was precisely what was sanctioned by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Laub. 
Plaintiff attempts to dismiss the clarion mandate of Laub with 
the patently false assertion that he did not recover the full 
amount of medical expense damages he believes he was entitled to by 
virtue of the Stipulation to Summary of Medical Charges. What 
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Plaintiff fails to acknowledge is that the jury, after receiving 
evidence of Plaintiff's medical expense damages, determined that 
only $4,000.00 of those medical expenses were reasonably and 
necessarily incurred and a proximate cause of the accident. The 
jury simply did not award Plaintiff the full amount he prayed for, 
and Plaintiff has not challenged the jury's determination. 
Plaintiff's argument that "[T]he verdict did not award plaintiff 
amounts for which he had been 'previously compensated,' "because 
the jury's award fell more than $3,000.00 short of his expectations 
is disingenuous at best. (Appellant's Brief at 10). It fails to 
support his contention that Laub is factually distinguishable from 
the case at bar. 
Plaintiff's attempt to distinguish Allstate Insurance Co. v. 
Ivie is also an inapposite. The trial of this action produced a 
judicial determination that Plaintiff was entitled to $4,000.00 in 
compensation for his medical expenses. Plaintiff was paid that 
amount; $3,000.00 in PIP payments and $1,000.00 by way of the 
ultimate award of the trial court. According to the jury's 
verdict, he has been made whole. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ivie 
dedicates no different result, and Plaintiff's single argument 
distinguishing his case from Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ivie fails 
because the Stipulation to Summary of Medical Charges did not 
remove from the jury's consideration the question of the amount of 
medical expense damages to which plaintiff was entitled. 
In his discussion of Dupuis v. Nielsen, 624 P.2d 685 (Utah 
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1981), Plaintiff makes the contumacious and completely 
unsupportable assertion that "[T]here is no dispute that, by the 
jury's verdict, Plaintiff's damages had been reduced by more than 
the amount of the PIP payments he has received." (Appellant's brief 
at 11). This further stretch of Plaintiff's mischaracterization of 
the facts is belied by the fact that the jury determined 
Plaintiff's medical expense "damages" to be $4,000.00 and that the 
court properly reduced that amount by $3,000.00, the amount of the 
PIP payments. Plaintiff's medical expense "damages" were never 
determined to be $7,815.00. His expectation of receiving that 
amount hinged upon his proving to a jury that it was appropriate. 
The "double reduction" plaintiff complains of and which fosters his 
reliance on Dupuis did not occur. 
If this court were to accept Plaintiff's mischaracterization 
of the scope and meaning of the Stipulation to Summary of Medical 
Charges, the effect would be to confer upon him the "double 
recovery" that Hill v. State Farm Mut. Aut. Ins. Co.. 765 P.2d 864, 
866 (Utah 1988) proscribes: 
When the amount of damages incurred by the 
insured has been judicially ascertained, the 
extent of the subrogation right of the insurer 
is usually undisputed. The insured is not 
entitled to double recovery, and the insurer 
is equitably entitled to recover any amounts 
from the insured that the insured recovered 
from the tort-feasor. 
The jury ascertained Plaintiff would be made whole by receiving 
$4,000.00 for the medical expenses he incurred. If Plaintiff 
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disputes that fact, he should have filed a motion for an additur or 
a new trial. See Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Dupuis 
624 P.2d at 686. Because he did not avail himself of that remedy, 
he cannot now claim he is entitled to any compensation for medical 
expense damages beyond the $4,000.00 awarded by the jury. The 
trial court's reduction of that award by $3,000.00, representing 
the amount of the PIP subrogation claim Plaintiff's no-fault 
insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Companies, filed 
with Defendant's insurer, Windsor Insurance Group, was proper under 
§ 31A-22-309(6) and Utah case law. 
CONCLUSION 
The jury awarded Plaintiff $4,000.00 for his medical expense 
damages. He received that amount through the $3,000.00 PIP 
benefits he was paid prior to trial and the additional $1,000.00 
ultimately awarded to him after trial. Under the authority of § 
31A-22-309(6) and Utah case law, the trial court properly reduced 
the $4,000.00 medical expense damages verdict by $3,000.00, which 
represented the PIP benefits Plaintiff had previously received from 
his own insurer. The parties' Stipulation to Summary of Medical 
Charges did not require the jury to award Plaintiff $7,815.00, and 
his argument before this court rests entirely on the incorrect 
assertion that it did. His argument is therefore without merit. 
Defendant requests that this court affirm the trial court's order 
reducing the medical expenses verdict by $3,000.00, the amount of 
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the PIP benefits paid by plaintiff's insurer 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this IZ day of January, 1994. 
r^kNGSQ^RD & TSAKALOS 
J. Tsaka&os 
Peter L. Rognlie 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee, 
Steve Quimby 
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I, Peter L. Rognlie, certify that on the (^ day of January, 
1994, I served 2 copies of the attached Brief of Appellee Steve 
Quimby, upon John Farrell Fay and Jim Mouritsen, counsel for the 
appellant in this matter, by mailing the copies to them by first-
class mail, with sufficient postage prepaid, to the following 
address: 
John Farrell Fay 
Jim Mouritsen 
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310 East 4500 South, Suite 620 
Salt^^keTfcity, Utah 84107 
Attorney f oj^ef endant/Appellee 
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l\ DepJty 
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Telephone: (801) 266-0999 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
•—oooOOOO 
ty Clerk 
WINTON APOSHIAN, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
STEVE QUIMBY, 
Defendant. 
STIPULATION TO SUMMARY 
OF MEDICAL CHARGES 
Civil-No. 920900339 PI 
Judge Richard Moffat 
ooobooo 
The above-named parties, through their respective 
counsel, hereby stipulate that the summary of plaintiff's medical 
charges (a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A") represent 
reasonable charges for medical services plaintiff winton Aposhian 
incurred as a result of the subject collision, and that these 
amounts may be entered into evidence without the need of further 
foundation. 
DATED this %£»—" day of January, 1993. 
S M ) » W E D .6 JENSEN 
DATED this IL 
Attofteys Wpilaintiff 
_ day ofv#arfl!ary, 1993, 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
At$#rn 
sakalos 
eys for Defendant 
Exhibit "A" 0114 
INSTRUCTION NO. / / 
Before the trial of this case, the Court held a conference with the lawyers for the parties. 
At this conference, the parties entered into certain stipulations or agreements, in which they 
agreed that facts could be taken as true without further proof. By this procedure, it is often 
possible to save much time. 
The stipulated facts are as follows: 
$7,815.00 incurred in accident related medical expenses. 
Since the parties have so agreed, you are to take these facts as true for purposes of this 
case. 
Exh ib i t , !B" 01 7 J 
"' Mrd Judicial District 
FEB 2 5 1993 
•V.'.T' AK2 MONTY | 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OOOOOOO 
WINTON APOSHIAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVE QUIMBY 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
Civil No. 920900339 PI 
Judge Richard Moffat 
Defendants. 
oooOooo 
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions.
 >lf you are persuaded 
by the evidence in favor of the issue presented, answer flYes.l! If 
you are not persuaded, answer the question lfNo.lf In order to 
answer each question, the agreement of only six jurors is required. 
Any six jurors may agree on any question. The same six jurors are 
not required to agree to each question before moving on. 
We, the jury, find by a preponderance of the evidence the 
indicated answers to the following questions: 
1. Was Defendant Steve Quimby negligent in causing the 
collision of November 28, 1990? 
Answer: Yes J \ No 
If you have answered "Yes" to the above question please go on. 
If you have answered the above question "No" you will not answer 
the remaining questions but will simply sign the verdict and inform 
the bailiff. 
1 
Exhibit "C" ^ 
2. Did Plaintiff Winton Aposhian sustain personal injuries 
arising out of the automobile collision of November 28, 1990? 
Answer: Yes X No 
3. Was the negligence of Defendant Steve Quimby a 
substantial factor in causing the injuries which Winton Aposhian 
suffered in the collision on November 28, 1990? 
Answer: Yes X No 
4. What amount of damages, if any, do you find Plaintiff 
Winton Aposhian sustained as a proximate result of the injuries* he 
sustained in the collision of November 28, 1990? 
Medical expenses: H;(?t?Q 
General damages: 
(Pain, Suffering & 
Reduction of quality of life, etc.) .5~>0$Q 
TOTAL: R; OOP 
DATED this c?S~ day of Fdhra&RJ . 1993. 
Foreperson " 
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